The published works of psychologist Jerome Kagan have tended to focus on a particular developmental period, such as Change and Continuity in Infancy and The Second Year, or on specific developmental themes, such as the exploration of temperament presented in Galen’s Prophecy. Yet in these works, it is obvious that Kagan, while running a prestigious child development laboratory, also enjoys writing about grander ideas. His prose is replete with allusions to Greek philosophers and contemporary novelists. It seems natural that, on the eve of his retirement, Kagan should choose to tackle three prevalent, if flawed, beliefs concerning human development in his most recent publication, Three Seductive Ideas.

Three Seductive Ideas begins by warning us that "the young sciences of human behavior are friendly to a number of . . . fallacious assumptions" (p. 1). Kagan devotes the majority of this book to three ubiquitous ideas, each in its own seductively titled chapter: "A Passion for Abstraction," "The Allure of Infant Determinism," and "The Pleasure Principle." Using evidence from hundreds of empirical studies, Kagan not only refutes each belief, but also explains why so many developmentalists are prone to hold them. These fallacies, Kagan argues, are detrimental to the field of developmental psychology and also to American society as a whole, for many well-intentioned social policies are built upon them.

In the first chapter, "A Passion for Abstraction," Kagan addresses the tendency of scientists of human behavior to "stubbornly resist replacing the single abstract word with a set of related but specific terms that fit nature more faithfully" (p. 14). The research community has been reluctant to deeply examine broad, abstract concepts such as fear, consciousness, intelligence, and temperament and to consider the agent of these states and the contexts in which they occur. Hence, we are led to believe that rats feel fear, that apes are intelligent, and so on, when, in fact, the sensation registered by animals is qualitatively different from the conscious emotional state felt by humans. Rats, for example, startle in response to a loud burst of noise, but to say that this reaction is akin to the anxiety that college freshmen feel before their first exam ignores a wide range of contextual factors that contribute to each state. Kagan suggests that in order for the field of human development to mature, researchers must account for the agents, targets, and contexts of these psychological processes.

The second chapter, "The Allure of Infant Determinism," is the most potentially influential portion of this book for two reasons. First, this chapter responds to a recent movement in developmental psychology to highlight the substantial changes that the human brain undergoes in the first two years of life. While infancy is a quite dramatic period in individual growth, overemphasizing its importance in the course of the life span has potentially dangerous consequences. For example, previously neglected children put up for adoption may be shunned by prospective parents who believe the argument that events in infancy decide later life outcomes, although studies of such populations have indicated otherwise (see p. 108). Second, the doctrine of infant determinism is the most widely held of the three beliefs explored in this book, as indicated by the state of Georgia’s commitment to provide every new mother with a Mozart CD and by the proliferation of teach-your-child-French-in-the-womb books published (and bought) in the last few years. Nearly any parent can cite a whole list of talents (linguistic, musical, social) that children will fail to develop if not nurtured properly before the second birthday.

According to Kagan, the trouble with infant determinism is the lack of scientific consensus on which adult qualities are tied most closely to early experiences. In fact, while children who are subject to deprivation in infancy are at the greatest risk for undesirable life outcomes, these outcomes are more likely a cumulative result of growing up in poverty, with limited access to education and health care, than of any parenting techniques practiced in the first two years. Kagan argues that the American public has latched onto this desire to overemphasize the relative importance of infancy due to a belief in individual self-betterment. As the logic goes, if some can climb academic, social, and professional ladders of success, then others’ failure to do so must be due to some lack of stimuli, or experience, or nurturing in the early years. This supposition relieves policymakers of the need to hold educational and economic institutions accountable for unequal outcomes. Kagan retorts, "It is a bit dishonest to suggest to poor parents that playing with and talking to their infant will protect the child from future academic failure and guarantee life success. . . . Of course, parents should be affectionate, playful, and conversational with their infants, but there are no guarantees" (p. 91). Other influences such as birth order, self-identification, and historical era (i.e., cohort effect) contribute as much, if not more, to individual development.

The final chapter, "The Pleasure Principle," is the most philosophical of the three. It begins with the Freudian proposal that human deeds are primarily motivated by a "pleasure of sense" or "a conscious feeling of pleasure that originates in changes in one or more of the sensory modalities" (p. 151). Kagan claims that this proposition reflects a persistent "reluctance to acknowledge the uniqueness of the human moral motive" (p. 164), and he challenges this reluctance by arguing "the desire to believe that self is ethically worthy . . . is universal" (p. 155). A moral sense emerges in children between the first and second year of life and is demonstrated by behavior such as looking sheepishly at a parent after spilling juice on the floor. Kagan’s caveat from the first chapter relates strongly to the material presented here, as quintessential human characteristics such as shame or guilt are often studied in animal laboratories, whereas, Kagan argues in the first chapter, they are more accurately studied in humans.

The three ideas presented in this book may be seductive, but Kagan’s thorough critique of them is more persuasive still. This book is highly recommended to researchers, teachers, and parents alike. It is a service to the field of developmental psychology and to the children Kagan has studied throughout his distinguished career.

L.N.O.